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Abstract 
  In less developed and transition economies, microlending has become an efficient instrument for 
providing small and micro-businesses with the necessary financial resources to launch operations. In 
the industrialized countries, with their highly developed banking systems, however, there has been 
ongoing debate on the question of whether an uncovered demand for microlending services exists - 
and if so, how large this demand actually is. The present study explores customer preferences for 
microlending products based on a survey of 213 small and micro-business owners in Germany in the 
year  2005.  Among  the  entrepreneurs  interviewed,  15%  reported  revolving  funding  needs  and  an 
interest  in  microloans. We  find  that  potential  recipients  of  microloan  products  are  retail  business 
owners,  foreign  small  business  owners,  and  persons  who  had  previously  received  private  loans. 
Therefore, incumbent financial institutions as well as lenders entering the market are well advised to 
use a focused marketing strategy in targeting these specific groups. Furthermore, financial products 
should feature rapid access to short-term loans combined with personal contacts to loan officers who 
are able to thoroughly understand the client’s business concept. A particularly noteworthy outcome of 
our study is that 65% of those surveyed financed their first three years of operations without applying 
for any loan at all. It is thoroughly possible that within this group a latent demand exists which could 
be unleashed by designing novel microlending products. 
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Self-employment  has  become  a  buzzword  in  European  labor  market  policy.  In 
Germany, the number of entrepreneurs working without any employees (referred to 
as  ‘solopreneurs’)  has  risen  from  1.4  to  2.1  million  in  the  last  ten  years  (see 
Piorkowsky and Fleißig, 2005). It is estimated that every year, about 500,000 people 
start their own business, again more than half of them as solopreneurs. At the same 
time,  Germany’s  largest  government  bank,  the  ‘KfW-Mittelstandsbank’  (KfW)  - 
which uses commercial banks as a distribution channel for its products and describes 
itself as the major supplier of start-up finance to small and micro-enterprises - reports 
that in 2005, about 6,000 KfW loans were granted in the segment of small business 
finance (below €25,000). 
 
During  recent  years,  German  media  have  been  replete  with  stories  of  young 
entrepreneurs with innovative business ideas whose loan approvals were rejected by 
their banks, and numerous analyses have shown that banks are doing an inadequate 
job in this area (see e.g., Evers, 2002). The low shares of loan-financed start-ups 
together  with  daily  newspaper  information  raised  the  impression  among  many 
politicians,  practitioners  and  consultants  that  most  entrepreneurs  in  Germany  are 
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being excluded from the credit market.
5 As such, improving access to finance seems 
pivotal  in  fostering  entrepreneurship  and  promoting  growth  in  small  and  micro-
businesses.  To  explain  the  exclusion  of  these  entrepreneurs,  the  asymmetric 
information approach (see inter alia Hillier and Ibrahimo, 1993) identifies two main 
reasons on the supply side: (1) Small businesses usually cannot provide collateral. As 
a result, they are unable to signal their creditworthiness and banks are unable to 
assess  the  credit  risk.  Although  banks  could  compensate  for  a  lack  of  collateral 
through additional screening and monitoring, this would also increase their costs. (2) 
Owners of small and micro-businesses tend to take out relatively small loans. The 
fixed costs of granting these loans tend to eat up most of the profits from interest 
payments,  and  as  a  result,  most  institutional  lenders  using  conventional  credit 
technologies consider loans to this target group to be unprofitable. 
 
Evidence  from  developing  and  emerging  countries  in  Asia,  Africa  and  South 
America, however, has shown that lending in this market segment can be a profitable 
business if appropriate technologies - known as microlending - are used (Armendáriz 
de Aghion and Morduch, 2005). Only in recent years has the attempt been made to 
put these technologies to use in European countries as well. Since then, successes 
have been reported especially by Eastern European microfinance institutions (MFIs) 
- for example, in Poland, Russia, and Georgia.
6 
 
During  the  last  ten  years,  several  local  microfinance  initiatives  have  also  been 
created in Germany to extend loans to specific target groups (most of these projects 
financed by Federal or Regional Ministries of Economics and Labour). Expectations 
were that they would attract thousands of young entrepreneurs, particularly during 
their start-up period. However, the initiatives never got off the ground - not due to 
low repayment rates but because entrepreneurs simply failed to apply for funding (22 
such  taxpayer-financed  initiatives  provided  services  to  a  total  of  less  than  1,000 
entrepreneurs per year; cf. Habschick, Evers and Jung, 2004). The reason for this 
failure is very simple, however: the restrictions imposed for the use of these public 
                                                 
5 For a representative survey of the low shares of credit-financed start-ups, see for instance Caliendo, 
Kritikos  and  Wiessner  (2006).  Many  sources  claim  that  micro  and  small  business  owners  are 
excluded from access to credit in Germany, see e.g., Reifner (2003). 
6 For a detailed analysis of respective MFIs, see e.g., Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch (2000), 
Nagarajan (2000) or Kritikos and Vigenina (2005).   4 




Such experiences gave rise to the idea for the present analysis: MFIs should focus 
not  only  on  the  supply  side  by  designing  products  that  mitigate  problems  of 
information asymmetries, but also on the demand side through products responding 
to  customers’  needs.  Similarly,  Woller  (2002)  advocates  a  radical  shift  in  MFIs’ 
policies,  moving  away  from  a  ‘product-driven’  microfinance  culture  and  giving 
priority  to  the  needs  of  the  customers.  To  date,  only  a  minority  of  MFIs  in  the 
developed world have conducted thorough market studies before launching their loan 
products.
8 Consequently, little is known about customer preferences. 
 
Our  paper  aims  to  close  this  research  gap  by  examining  the  demand  side  of  the 
microlending market in Germany. It intends to quantify the typical funding needs of 
small and micro businesses, to describe the intended use of funds acquired by the 
small  business  owners,  and  to  identify  the  financial  sources  typically  used  by 
entrepreneurs to cover their financial needs. Our analysis focuses on business owners 
who financed their first three years’ operations through borrowing. In particular, we 
identify which groups of business owners show a preference for microloans, and 
identify the product features that best serve their needs. Based on our findings, we 
derive the main aspects of a successful MFI marketing strategy. Thus, by merging 
current theory on entrepreneurship and microfinance, we provide a comprehensive 
picture of the microlending market in Germany.  
 
The  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  Section  II  describes  previous  theoretical  and 
empirical research results and outlines our research agenda. Section III gives a short 
                                                 
7 Restrictions imposed by public authorities are manifold (Habschick, Evers and Jung, 2004): persons 
usually have to be unemployed, sometimes below a certain age, sometimes of a certain sex, have to 
use  loans  only  for  certain  purposes  or  have  to  start  in  a  certain  industry.  The  most  important 
restrictions, however, for almost all programs are that businesses still have to be in the planning 
period and that borrowers only get these special loans once. Any firm owner who is already active 
in  the  market  is  ineligible  for  these  products.  The  last  two  conditions  are  particularly 
counterproductive  as  it  is  crucial  for  an  effective  screening  procedure  that  i)  business  owners 
already have gained some experience in the market and that ii) they have a chance to get subsequent 
loans (cf. Vigenina and Kritikos, 2004). 
8 Telephone interviews by one of the authors (based on interview guidelines avoiding demand effects 
like socially desirable answers) with five major European MFIs in October 2005 showed that no 
MFI had made a preliminary market research. Instead, they applied a trial-and-error approach and 
gradually adapted their loan products to their clients’ needs.    5 
overview of the finance programs that exist in Germany to support small businesses. 
Sections IV and V describe the data and present the empirical analysis. Section VI 
discusses implications for a microfinance marketing strategy. Section VII concludes. 
 
2. Previous Research 
2.1 Small Business Finance Theory 
In a seminal paper, Ang (1992) demonstrated the importance of acquiring start-up 
capital for small businesses. While finance theory generally posits that all firms have 
equal access to financial markets and that all share similar competitive positions (van 
Auken and Neeley, 1996), small businesses often face severe difficulties compared 
to  large  businesses.  Numerous  supply-side  factors  -  limited  information,  market 
imperfections,  and  agency  relationships  to  name  only  a  few  -  affect  small  firms 
particularly severely, making traditional finance theory inapplicable to their situation 
(Ang, 1992; McMahon et al., 1993; Petty and Bygrave, 1993). Indeed, sources of 
finance available to small businesses differ strongly from those available to large 
companies,  and  their  widespread  lack  of  access  to  the  loan  market  violates  the 
assumptions of perfect capital markets (Ang 1992, van Auken and Neeley 1996). 
 
A  considerable  body  of  theoretical  literature  deals  with  the  idea  that  asymmetric 
information is at the root of credit rationing (Jaffee and Russel, 1976; Stiglitz and 
Weiss,  1981;  Besanko  and  Thakor,  1987a,  1987b).  This  idea  rests  on  two  main 
assumptions about the lack of financial capital observed among small and micro-
businesses, in particular during their start-up phase: (1) lenders cannot distinguish 
between high and low-risk borrowers, and borrowers cannot easily signal their own 
risk-taking behavior, (2) loan contracts are subjected to limited liability. According 
to this theory, credit is rationed when the  amount lenders are willing to offer to 
borrowers is limited, or when no lender is willing to make a loan to a borrower. 
Despite the ongoing theoretical discussion, little consensus has been reached about 
whether  credit  rationing  is  an  economically  significant  phenomenon  (Berger  and 
Udell, 1992). 
 
With  regard  to  the  demand  side  of  loan  markets,  there  has  been  less  theoretical 
research. Based on the asymmetric information approach, the Pecking Order Theory 
(Myers,  1984)  claims  that  businesses  adhere  to  a  hierarchy  of  financing sources,   6 
preferring internal financing when available, and preferring debt over equity when 
external financing is required.
9 In addition to this work, we believe other disciplines 
provide  evidence  that  can  contribute  to  explaining  borrower  behavior.  As  an 
example, recent research in the neurosciences has found evidence that people who 
experienced negative outcomes in the recent past (such as previous unemployment), 
might in the near future tend to avoid higher risks in comparison to persons with 
positive  experiences  in  the  recent  past.  Applied  to  the  small  and  micro-business 
sector,  these  findings  allow  for  the  conjecture  that  start-ups  (in  particular 
entrepreneurs coming out of unemployment) might try to avoid financial solutions 
that entail borrowed capital (for an article summarizing the emerging neuroscience 
research, see Bechara and Damasio, 2005).  
 
2.2 Empirical Evidence on Small Business Finance 
Small businesses are generally not publicly traded and are not required to release 
financial information. This lack of data is probably one of the main reasons why 
small business finance a decade ago had been ‘one of the most underresearched areas 
in finance’ (Berger and Udell, 1998).
10 Since then in the US, research has grown 
tremendously  in  this  field  due  to  the  influx  of  several  different data  sets -  most 
importantly, the National Survey of Small Business Finances (NSSBF). It provides 
information on the income situation of small businesses (less than 500 employees) as 
well as the availability of different types of external finance. Using the NSSBF data, 
Bitler,  Robb  and  Wolken  (2001)  assert  that  commercial  banks  are  the  dominant 
source of financial services for small businesses. The Office of Advocacy of the 
Small  Business  Administration  (2003)  finds  little  evidence  that  creditworthy 
borrowers faced substantial credit supply constraints, and Berger and Udell (1998) 
emphasize the importance of private loans for small business finance.  
 
Harhoff and Körting (1998) were the first to replicate the NSSBF survey design in 
Germany. Their research concentrated on the nature of firm-bank relationships and 
their  impact  on  collateral  requirements.  Funding  needs  were  measured  via  the 
                                                 
9 Though initially designed to explain the financing practices of large corporations, it was soon recog-
nized that this theory could also be applied to small businesses (Scherr, Sugrue and Ward, 1993). 
10  Before  that,  several  stand-alone  studies  analyzed  financing  experiences  of  small  business  in 
different US regions: van Auken and Carter (1989), Lamberson and Johnson (1992), Carter, van 
Auken and Harms (1992). Pettit and Singer (1985) were the first to provide a foundation for the 
development of research in the area of small business finance.   7 
volume  of  credit  lines  in  a  static  model.  They  conclude  that  lending  is  typically 
heavily concentrated on one or two financing institutions in the SME segment of the 
German  economy.  Hinz  and  Jungbauer-Gans  (1999)  compare  the  distribution  of 
start-up capital between previously unemployed and previously employed business 
founders. They observe that previously employed founders raise a higher average 
sum of outside capital, rely more heavily on bank financing, and have better access 
to outside capital as compared to unemployed founders. 
 
In  a  recent  representative  study  (Caliendo,  Kritikos  and  Wiessner,  2006)  which 
focused  on  the  impact  of  the  bridging  allowance  on  survival  rates  of  formerly 
unemployed  entrepreneurs  in  Germany  (the  focus  of  the  present  paper),  3,000 
persons  who  founded  a  business  in  2003  were  surveyed  in  2005.  One  question 
focused on the sums of the start-up capital employed during the first two years. Of 
these entrepreneurs, 53% reported needing no or very low funding (less than €5,000), 
14% reported needing between €5,000 and €10,000, 28% reported needing between 
€10,000 and €50,000, and 5% reported needing more than €50,000. 
 
Moreover,  in  a  ‘Eurobarometer’  survey  that  analyzed  SME  finance  not  only  in 
Germany but within the European Union, it was found that German SMEs seem to 
face  greater  hurdles  in  accessing  loans  compared  to  their  European  counterparts. 
When evaluating the quality of bank service in terms of consultancy, sector-specific 
know-how, general knowledge and expertise, and the suitability of the loan offers to 
customer needs, German banks fared below average.  
 
Copisarow (2004), the founder of ‘Street UK’, a British microfinance institution, has 
provided a comprehensive practitioner’s field report on the use of microfinance in 
industrialized countries and an analysis of potential clients’ needs. She highlights 
important  aspects  of  microfinance  services:  they  should  offer  small  amounts  of 
capital, minimal waiting time for loan approval, high probability of receiving loans, 
easy subsequent access to loans, and clear and pre-explained terms and conditions. 
She concludes that the target market is largely made up of a segment of society that 
lies between the poor and the non-poor, that is, a population group that does not have 
access to loans from mainstream financial institutions but at the same time is not 
eligible for social welfare. Hence, non-financial business support services are needed   8 
to create and enhance financial literacy and business knowledge. For the case of 
Germany, Jacob and Warg (1997) and Kritikos and Wiessner (2000) proposed the 
application of microlending technologies to the classic credit business. 
 
2.3 Research Agenda 
For the purpose of our study, we collected data on the demand side of this loan 
segment containing information (a) on the financing patterns of small and micro-
business owners and (b) their attitudes towards typical microlending products. Using 
this information, we were able to establish a link between the existing literature on 
small business finance and financial marketing. While the former addresses funding 
needs and financial sources used to meet these needs, the latter analyzes the design 
of financial products suitable to the characteristics of small and micro-businesses. 
 
Accordingly, we first examine the sources of capital available to these businesses, 
allowing  us  to  answer  the  question  of  whether  small  and  micro-businesses  in 
Germany face liquidity constraints. Second, we group the respondents according to 
their preferences for microloans, taking into account various characteristics such as 
previous experiences with banks, product preferences, and funding patterns (i.e. the 
amounts  of  capital  needed  each  year).  We  then  identify  potential  microfinance 
clients, describe the characteristics of a loan product appropriate to their needs, and 
develop a marketing strategy for how MFIs can best reach such clients. 
 
Testimonials  from  small  business  owners  and  the  practical  experiences  of  MFIs 
suggest  that  there  is  a  large  latent  demand  for  microfinance  services  in  the 
industrialized world (Copisarow, 2000; 2004). However, there has been no attempt 
so far to understand the structure of this demand empirically. The results derived 
from the present study will be highly relevant for existing European MFIs, and useful 
as well for MFIs planning to enter this market.  
 
3. Small Business Finance in Germany 
The German SME sector was comprised of almost four million businesses in 2004. 
More than 90% of them achieved a yearly turnover of less than €1 million, and 55% 
were run by self-employed persons (Piorkowsky and Fleißig, 2005). The average 
year-to-year survival rate of all businesses in recent years has been 92.5% (Constant   9 
and Zimmermann, 2005). As to the number of new business start-ups, the available 
data sources produce  a fairly inconsistent picture: for the  year 2004, the number 
varies between 350,000 and 570,000 depending on the data source and it is estimated 
that about every second firm was created out of unemployment (Kritikos and Kahle, 
2007). Hence, approximations of the absolute market size for microfinance services 
in Germany depend heavily on the data they are based on.  
 
Inside and outside the formal banking system, there are various funding alternatives 
for small and micro-business owners. As the main provider inside the system, the 
Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW) offers several loan products aimed at small 
and micro-businesses in their start-up phase. Maximum maturities vary between five 
and ten  years, and maximum loan amounts range between €10,000 and €50,000. 
According to the information of a staff member of KfW, in 2004 about 6,000 loans 
with a volume of up to €25,000 (the relevant segment of microfinance) have been 
extended. 
 
In  order  to  assist  business  owners  displaced  by  corporate  restructuring,  many 
regional governments set up their own loan funds (in addition to the federal fund) - 
most  of  them  outside  the  formal  banking  system.  Despite  the  existence  of  such 
programs, only about 1,000 loans were actually approved by 22 different regional or 
local institutions (Habschick, Evers and Jung, 2004) Therefore, although there are 
several  financing  alternatives  in  particular  for  people  founding  a  business  out  of 
unemployment  through  both  commercial  banks  and  other  sources,  only  a  small 
minority is actually making use of these services at present. 
 
In this context, another support scheme must be mentioned: the ‘bridging allowance’, 
which is granted to previously unemployed business founders for a period of six 
months. This grant nearly equals the unemployment benefit the entrepreneur would 
have  received  had  he  or  she  remained  jobless.  Since  these  funds  are  generally 
available to all entrepreneurs starting a business out of unemployment, and since we 
interviewed  only  start-ups  that  used  this  benefit,  we  did  not  collect  specific   10 
information on the amount of the allowance in our survey. In the year of the survey, 
2004, more than 180,000 persons received the bridging allowance.
11 
 
4. Sample description 
4.1 Overview of descriptive statistics 
Our data is derived from a survey that provides information on the sources of finance 
of  different  small  and  micro-business  owners  during  their  first  three  years  of 
operations. The survey was conducted between mid-October and December 2005 in 
the form of 213 telephone interviews with people who had become entrepreneurs 
during  the  past  five  years.  The  interviews  were  held  using  a  standardized 
questionnaire which we had developed on the basis of 34 non-standardized personal 
interviews with small and micro-business owners, as well as through a focus group 
comprising  seven  participants.  The  majority  of  the  questions  were  closed-ended, 
which  enabled  respondents  to  answer  unambiguously.  When  necessary,  the 
interviewer gave additional explanations. 
 
The  questionnaire  was  designed  to  collect  a  wide  range  of  information  and  was 
divided  into  two  main  parts.  The  first  contained  questions  pertaining  to  funding 
patterns and sources of capital during the first three years of business operations. The 
second  part  dealt  with  possible  funding  problems  encountered  and  interest  of 
respondents  in  microlending  schemes.  We  interviewed  one  person  per  firm  (the 
owner-entrepreneur), and in the case of team-run companies, only the main person in 
charge.  Survey  participants  were  selected  from  two  client lists  given  by  German 
start-up centers in the provinces of Hesse and Bavaria. The lists were comprised of 
clients  who  had  taken  part  in  coaching  and  seminars  held  in  2000  and  2003  in 
preparation for self-employment.
12 Consequently, at the time of the interview, all 
respondents were able to provide a consistently retrospective view of funding issues 
since all of them had been active in the market for three to five years. 
 
                                                 
11 Between January 2003 and June 2006, the federal government introduced a second support measure 
(the so-called ‘Me-Inc.’) for previously unemployed business founders which was used by another 
170,000 persons in 2004, but our sample does not include these benefit recipients. Both support 
schemes were replaced by a new scheme (the so called ‘Gründungszuschuss’) on July 1, 2006. 
12 In order to receive this  kind of support the applicant  had to be employed before s/he became 
unemployed. In our sample, more than two thirds of the respondents had been unemployed for less 
than six months which corresponds to the general figures for all founders out of unemployment (cf. 
IAB et al., 2005).   11 
------------------------------- 
insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------- 
 
The sample was split into two main groups: those who had required outside finance 
during their first three years of operations (35% of the sample; we refer to them as 
‘borrowers’) and those who had sufficient equity capital to finance their business 
(65% of the sample; we refer to them as ‘non-borrowers’).
13 This distinction is made 
for two reasons: first, it seems appropriate to observe those persons separately, who 
were in need for outside finance in the past, as they represent the potential customer 
group  for  microloans.  Second,  when  describing  target  group  traits  and  product 
features of microloans, we will focus our analysis on the borrower group and ignore 
the  non-borrowers  as  their  statements  are  hypothetical  in  this  respect.  Our  first 
observation  concerns  the  market’s  potential  size:  in  their  first  three  years  of 
operations,  only  35%  of  respondents  were  in  need  of  outside  finance,  while  the 
remaining 65% were able to do without.
14 
 
‘Outside finance’ is used here as an umbrella term to refer to all financial resources 
that  do  not  constitute  equity  capital,  for  instance,  bank  loans  and  private  loans 
obtained through friends or relatives.
15 Table 1 presents some descriptive statistics 
for these groups. The variables are classified according to the attributes describing 
the  business  owner  (owner-entrepreneur  characteristics);  those  describing  the 
business (business characteristics); and the funding needs of the firm for each of the 
first three years (financial characteristics).  
 
Thirty-seven  percent  of  the  borrowers  had  started  retail  or  crafts  businesses, 
compared to a mere 11% of non-borrowers. Chi-square bivariate correlations reveal 
that  retail  (p=.003)  and  crafts  enterprises  (p=.059)  exhibit  significantly  greater 
financial needs during the first three years than do other lines of business. This is 
                                                 
13 The high share of persons not in need for outside finance might be explained by the fact that they 
received the so called ‘bridging allowance’ for the first six months after the foundation of their 
business which grants them a basic income during this time. 
14 Similar figures were obtained by Caliendo, Kritikos and Wiessner (2006) in a telephone survey of 
2,500 West German start-ups that had used the bridging allowance in 2003 to launch business. In a 
similar study, Fraser (2005) found that in the UK, almost two out of three businesses had used 
personal savings as the principal source of finance to start the business, and one-third had received 
funds through a bank loan or a private loan. 
15 We did not ask for VC or equity finance, as typically small and micro-businesses are not eligible for 
this kind of funding.   12 
highly plausible given that most of these businesses require higher investments, for 
example, in the purchase of physical stock and machines.  
 
4.2. Comparison of borrowers vs. non-borrowers 
Funding needs of borrowers and non-borrowers during their start-up phase average 
out  at  about  €15,000.
16  Table  2  shows  the  funding  needs  of  borrowers  and  non-
borrowers for each of the three years in consideration. A clear separation can be 
observed (a) between year one and the two following years, as well as (b) between 
borrowers and non-borrowers. While more than 80% of the non-borrowers needed 
less than €10,000 in the first year, this was the case for only 47% of the borrowers: 
more than a quarter of these businesses required more than €25,000. The levels of 
funding needs in the two subsequent years differ significantly from the first, while 
years two and three both exhibit similar patterns. Obviously, in both groups, there is 
a high percentage of businesses that exhibit no funding needs at all after year one. 
Thus, we see two kinds of investment patterns: one group of businesses requiring 
one-time  funding,  and  a  second  group  with  recurring  funding  needs.  We  will 
examine this observation further in the next section, when we break down the market 
according to funding patterns. 
 
------------------------------- 
insert Table 2 about here 
------------------------------- 
 
Respondents were asked to specify the main intended use of the funds in each of the 
three  years.  Not  surprisingly,  a  large  percentage  of  businesses  used  the  funds  to 
cover start-up expenses such as IT infrastructure, office equipment, and materials for 
their  first  fiscal  year.  What  is  crucial  to  know  for  the  appropriate  design  of 
microfinance  products  is  that  liquidity  finance  played  an  important  role  for  the 
borrower group in the two following years: more than 50% reported liquidity gaps 
that had to be closed, for instance, the entrepreneur’s own costs of living and pre-
financing customer orders. Cases of ‘emergency finance’, such as back duties falling 
due, were also mentioned. 
 
                                                 
16 This figure is slightly lower than the average of about €20,000 reported by Hinz and Jungbauer-
Gans (1999) for the group of unemployed business founders, while the study by Caliendo, Kritikos 
and Wiessner (2006) produced an average amount very similar to the present data.   13 
4.3 Experiences when raising capital 
A  series  of  earlier  studies  found  that  raising  capital  poses  a  problem  to  young 
entrepreneurs (van Auken and Neeley, 1996; Blanchflower and Oswald, 1998; Hinz 
and  Jungbauer-Gans,  1999;  Eurobarometer,  2005).  Figure  1  presents  a  more 
differentiated picture: 84% of business owners in the borrower group applied for a 
bank loan and almost two-thirds were successful, that is, they were able to cover 
their funding needs through an installment loan or an overdraft facility.
17 Over 90% 
of business owners who had applied for a loan had a formal meeting with the bank 
and explained their business concept to a bank employee. Of those who visited a 
bank, 71.9% inquired about a loan, 12.5% about an overdraft facility and 15.6% 
about both. Among those who received bank loans, less than 5% of the subsample 
still  required  additional  funds.  Therefore,  we  may  conclude  that  when  banks  do 




What  about  businesses  that  reported  no  need  for  outside  finance?  Figure  1 
approaches this question by first breaking this group in two: those who did and those 
who did not need outside finance. The right subsample on the intermediate level 
shows those business owners who did not apply for a bank loan, either because they 
did not need a loan to finance their business thanks to other sources, or because they 
were afraid of incurring debt. When explicitly asked if fear of indebtedness was an 
obstacle to applying for a loan, roughly one-third of all non-borrowers said yes. 
 
------------------------------- 
insert Figure 1 about here 
------------------------------- 
 
The subsample on the bottom right is comprised of business owners who did apply 
for a loan but were rejected. The reasons for rejection were unknown since banks 
usually  do  not  disclose  this  information  to  applicants.
19  In  relation  to  the  whole 
sample, slightly more than 10% of business owners were rejected by banks. One in 
                                                 
17 One possible reason for the high rate of loan approvals might be that all interviewed business 
owners had received professional training and coaching during the start-up phase of their business. 
18 This coincides with the findings of Lamberson and Johnson (1992) who interviewed 140 firms on 
their financing experiences, of whom only 6% reported dissatisfaction with the amount of credit 
available. 
19 Evidence from interviews with loan officers reveals that the main reasons for rejection are (i) low 
loan volumes, (ii) poor business concepts, (iii) redlining of certain industries (e.g. retail) and (iv) a 
low degree of borrower creditworthiness (IAB et al., 2005).   14 
three of these rejected loan applicants reported a funding gap, while the rest got 
along without bank loans. This shows that liquidity constraints do exist, but on a 
limited scale. 
 
Putting the observations of this subsection together, we conclude that two-thirds of 
the  business  owners  who  applied  for  a  loan  were  successful.  Among  those  who 
launched  their  business  without  a  loan,  we  observed  three  reasons  for  doing  so: 
These business founders either i) did not need outside capital, or ii) did not want to 
incur debts, or iii) their loan applications were rejected. 
 
5. Empirical analysis 
5.1 Market segmentation 
We aimed to divide the borrowers into groups according to their expressed interest in 
microfinance  products.  For  this  purpose,  we  presented  a  microloan  with  the 
following properties to respondents: 
·  the loan value varies between €1,000 and €10,000; 
·  the term of each loan ranges between one and two years; 
·  there is no amortization-free period; 
·  the repayment scheme is fully flexible (comparable to an overdraft facility); 
·  applicants are informed of the credit decision within five days; 
·  interest rates amount to approximately 20% per annum; 
·  the  loan  officer  acts  as  a  partner  to  the  client  and  problems  are  solved 
cooperatively, 
·  different kinds of collateral can be used. 
 
These features are based on actual microloans offered in other European countries 
such as the UK, Poland, Russia, and Georgia.
20 It was mentioned explicitly in the 
interview that loans with these characteristics are not offered by traditional banks in 
these countries. Respondents were then asked whether they would ‘buy’ such a loan. 
If respondents rejected it, they were asked why. If they said that interest rates were 
the main reason, we presented a showcase calculation giving interest payments in 
absolute terms (a strategy commonly used by MFIs). Respondents were then asked if 
this display would change their minds. A dichotomous variable ‘target group’ was 
defined to take the value 1 if respondents were interested in the product and 0 if they 
were either not interested or not sure. In total, 41.3% of respondents said they would 
                                                 
20 Specific product features are discussed, e.g., in Copisarow (2000), and for the transition economies 
in Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch (2000) and Vigenina and Kritikos (2004) among others.   15 




5.2 Tests and Results 
(1)  Is  target  group  membership  correlated  to  preceding  experiences  in  bank 
meetings? 
In this section, we explore the experiences that potential microloan clients had during 
their  bank  meetings.  Respondents  were  asked  to  rate  the  service  quality  they 
experienced during their most recent bank meeting on a Likert-type scale varying 
from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). We expected to observe a strong 
correlation between negative experiences with banks and target group membership. 
 
To analyze our assertion, a Mann-Whitney U test is used. We further expected that 
having received a bank loan would predispose a potential micro-business owner to 
evaluate his or her meetings with the bank positively. This rationale is psychological: 
a favorable meeting outcome leads to a positive evaluation. On the other hand, the 
bad experience of not receiving a loan may result in a negative evaluation due to the 
unsatisfactory outcome. To test this assumption, a variable ‘received loan’ is defined 
to contain information on the outcome of bank meetings. It takes the value 1 for 
those who received a loan and 0 for those who did not. 
 
Lower mean ranks for those who did not receive a loan indicate that the sum of the 
ranks must be smaller than the sum of the ranks for those who did. Table 3 illustrates 
the results. The mean ranks indicate that micro-business owners who did not receive 
a loan rate the bank’s customer service lower than those who did. The z-value of 
-3.14 reveals that this result is significant at the 0.1% level. 
 
 
                                                 
21 This target group classification (‘accepters’: potential clients who are interested in micro-loans vs. 
‘rejecters’: business owners who are not) follows the logic of the consideration set theory. Complex 
decision processes like the acquisition of capital require a reduction of alternatives in order to reach 
cognitive  relief.  The  decision  maker,  in  our  case  the  micro-business  owner,  only  takes  those 
alternatives into account that are mentally stored in his consideration set, i.e. that he is acquainted 
with  (which  in  our  study  is  assured  by  describing  the  microloan  product)  and  that  are  valued 
positively (Crowley and Williams, 1991). If micro-loans are not stored in the consideration set of a 
potential customer because of the negative valence attached to it, he will reject them outright. A 
consideration  set  is  dynamic,  however.  Certain  alternatives  can  be  upgraded  from  negative  to 
positive in response to specifically designed marketing measures, which we used by presenting 
interest payments in absolute terms.    16 
------------------------------- 
insert Table 3 about here 
------------------------------- 
 
With all differences in the mean ranks being significant (except for the last item, 
which  only  shows  marginal  significance  at  the  10%  level),  it  is  evident  that 
unsuccessful loan applicants tended to rank their banks’ service quality significantly 
lower  than  their  successful  counterparts.  This  confirms  the  psychological  bias 
assumption.  We  conclude  that  if  we  want  to  relate  microloan  affinity  to  how 
recipients  rated  bank  service  quality,  we  must  take  this  correlation  into  account. 
Therefore, in the following we will concentrate only on the group of applicants who 
received  a  loan  and  thereby  adjust  for  the  above-mentioned  psychological  bias. 
Among  the  group  of  successful  bank  loan  applicants,  we  differentiate  the  target 
group dummy into persons who were interested in a microloan and those who were 
not. Again, we apply a Mann-Whitney U test. Table 4 presents the results.  
 
------------------------------- 
insert Table 4 about here 
------------------------------- 
 
The findings from the rank-sum test confirm our initial expectation. Business owners 
who showed an interest in microloan products had significantly worse experiences 
during their bank meetings than the other group, even if both groups received a bank 
loan. Their evaluation of the meetings was significantly less positive, and they did 
not feel that they had been taken seriously, as fully fledged clients. Furthermore, 
their responses differed greatly regarding whether bank employees understood their 
business concepts. Also, these applicants did not feel well-informed on the terms and 
conditions of the possible loan products.  
 
Result 1: Prior negative experiences with banks are positively correlated with target 
group membership, even if the business owner previously received a loan from a 
bank.  
 
In this context we should emphasize that the causality between the two variables is 
ambiguous.  It  seems,  however,  plausible  to  assume  that  banks  are  usually  not 
interested  in  extending  small  or  micro  loans  to  businesses,  and  that  this  is  then   17 
reflected in the service quality they offer these applicants. Following this line of 
argumentation, target-group membership would also be a determinant to perceived 
service quality. 
 
(2) What are the central product features? 
Microloans are mainly characterized by i) flexible repayment schemes after the loan 
has  been  disbursed,  ii)  fast  access  to  loans  and  iii)  individual  support from  loan 
officers (Copisarow, 2000). This in turn implies higher interest rates than the usual 
market rate. To find out which product features are important to potential microloan 
clients, we provided them with a set of statements and asked to rate them on a scale 
from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). We employ a Mann-Whitney U test 
to analyze group-specific differences. Table 5 presents the results.  
 
------------------------------- 
insert Table 5 about here 
------------------------------- 
 
The rank-sum test reveals two significant differences between the subsamples. First, 
business owners who showed an interest in microloans stated that they operate in 
segments that demand fast access to loans. Second, they were willing to pay higher 
interest  rates  for  faster  access  to  loans.  Product  features  like  flexible  repayment 
schemes, amortization-free periods, and individual support from a loan officer are 
clearly not important enough to allow distinctions to be drawn between groups. 
 
Finally,  we  analyzed  the  correlations  between  bank  assessments  and  product 
features. Our results show that applicants who gave an overall bad rating of bank 
meetings were actually willing to pay higher interest rates for loans. The same holds 
for  those  who  stated  that  they  had  not  been  treated  as  fully  fledged  clients. 
Experiences from the interviews with the members of the focus group show that 
future clients want to be assured of  a high probability of receiving a loan. High 
rejection rates tend to deter potential clients from applying for loans and information 
about high rejection rates spreads among potential clients in a very short time span. 
 
Result 2: Borrowers who are interested in microloans are prepared to pay higher 
interest rates if, in return, they have high chances of receiving the loan and if the 
access to the loan is fast and easy.   18 
(3) Do target group members exhibit a typical financing pattern? 
Figure  2  depicts  the  financing  patterns  for  target  group  and  non-target  group 
members. There is a clear discrepancy between the funding needs of the two groups 
in year one. Looking at the three-year trend, the target group exhibits fairly constant 
funding needs, while the other group reports higher funding needs in the first year 
and rather low needs in years two and three. An ANOVA test was conducted to 
compare the groups’ funding needs in each year, yielding a (weakly) significant F 
value only for the first period (p=.09). We presume that a lower level of start-up 
finance is a distinguishing feature of the target group. 
------------------------------- 
insert Figure 2 about here 
------------------------------- 
 
We  conclude  that  borrowers  interested  in  microloan  products  exhibit  a  specific 
financing pattern characterized by a fairly constant need for funding. Unlike non-
target group members, these clients reported needing an average of between €6,000 
and €12,000 per year over the three-year period.
22 This is a possible benchmark loan 
size for microloans. Funding needs of non-target group clients, in contrast, average 
€19,000
23 in year one and drop to far below €5,000 in the subsequent two years. The 
higher funding volume in the first  year might indicate that these borrowers have 
received bank loans that are generally approved only beyond a certain amount. In 
this case, banks are usually more willing to finance subsequent loans. Our analysis 
also showed that these borrowers were granted overdraft facilities significantly more 
often than target group members in the years after founding the business. 
 
Equity ratios of the two groups display a palpable discrepancy: target group members 
continuously  exhibit  lower  equity  ratios  than  non-target  group  members.  An 
ANOVA  test  confirms  statistically  significant  differences  only  for  the  first  year 
(p=.02).  As  a  certain  amount  of  equity  capital  is  the  necessary  precondition  for 
receiving a bank loan, it is quite probable that target group members are largely 
excluded from the formal banking system. Therefore, microloans present a viable 
funding alternative and higher interest rates do not deter them. 
 
                                                 
22 Figure 2 is adjusted for seven outliers within the borrower group as they distorted the means quite 
heavily (including the outliers, means oscillate between €15,000 and €20,000). The 75
th percentile 
including outliers is € 25,000. 
23 The average is € 32,000 when we do not adjust for outliers.   19 
We summarize that compared to non-target group members, microloan applicants 
have i) lower funding needs during the start-up phase, ii) more evenly distributed 
funding needs, and iii) less equity. Since most existing German MFIs offered loan 
products  only  to  start-ups  in  year  one,  this  observation  probably  explains  the 
exceptionally low demand for these products. 
 
(4) A model for determining target group membership 
We developed a model for the borrower group that enables us to determine relevant 
factors affecting target group membership. For this purpose, a binary logit regression 
was  used  with  ‘target  group’  as  the  dependent  variable.  In  Model  A,  personal 
explanatory variables were applied. The business variables were added to perform a 
second Model B. Finally, an extended Model C was estimated, in which financial 
characteristics  of  the  firm  were  included.  With  this  approach,  the  advantages  of 
multivariate methods are exploited, as measured effects might disappear if they are 
controlled for alternative effects of other explanatory variables. Nagelkerke R² and 
Cox  &  Snell  R²  provide  estimates  of  good  overall  model  fit  for  each  of  the 
specifications. 
 
Table 6 reports the estimation results of the three models employed. The business 
owner’s age does not have a significant impact on target group membership. The 
same holds for gender, which is only weakly significant in Model C. Foreigners have 
a higher propensity to be interested in microloan products, which could be due to the 
fact that they are more often excluded from the banking system and therefore depend 
more  heavily  on  alternative  funding.  Blanchflower  et  al.  (2003)  show  similar 
empirical evidence for this observation when analyzing small businesses’ access to 
the US credit market. Concerning the education variables, master craftsmen have a 
significantly lower propensity to belong to the target group, which is indicated by the 
negative sign of the dummy. They usually have higher funding needs during the 
start-up period due to the need for more expensive equipment than, for example, 
businesses in the service sector.  
 
------------------------------- 
insert Table 6 about here 
------------------------------- 
   20 
With respect to the business variables, we observe that firms operating in the retail 
business  have  a  strong  propensity  towards  microloans.  This  coincides  with  our 
findings that potential microloan clients need fast access to funds. Retail business is 
traditionally characterized by near-term funding needs, often triggered by the need to 
pre-finance inventory (van Auken and Carter, 1989). The other industry dummies 
have  no  significant  bearing  on  target  group  membership.  The  variable  ‘team 
foundation’ shows a weak positive significance in Model B when controlling for 
financial characteristics. We therefore conclude that being a retail business is the 
only relevant firm characteristic that determines target group membership - a result 
that coincides with the evidence from many countries after microfinance products 
were introduced (Kritikos and Vigenina 2005) and with the anecdotal evidence that 
owners of firms in the retail business sector are “redlined” by commercial banks. 
 
Model C contains a set of dummies providing information on the firm’s funding 
characteristics. Businesses that received a private loan during their first three years of 
operations  tended  to  show  a  weak  significant  interest  in  micro-loans.  Anecdotal 
evidence  from  the  interviews  confirms  that  people  who  have  frequently  received 
funding through private loans are reluctant to borrow from friends and relatives in 
the future, as this implies a certain kind of social dependency. Applicants who had 
previously received a bank loan are less likely to belong to the target group due to 
their  preference  for  the  lower  interest  rates  offered  by  banks.  This  confirms  the 
conjecture we made when analyzing funding patterns. The only caveat to this finding 
was detected in Section 5.2(1): borrowers who experienced poor bank service quality 
showed a significantly higher interest in microloan products. Finally, the dummy 
‘funding needs in year two or three’ does affect target group membership positively, 
but with a weak significance. This validates our financing pattern analysis, which 
showed rather constant funding needs for the target group and therefore an elevated 
need for finance after foundation of the business. Receiving an overdraft and a need 
for liquidity finance do not affect target group membership.  
 
Result 3: Business owners who are interested in microloan products can be found 
among  foreign  and  retail  business  owners  as  well  as  among  those  who  had 
previously  received  private  loans.  Those  who  needed  finance  in  the  years  after 
business foundation were also more likely to belong to the target group.    21 
6. Implications for a marketing strategy for MFIs 
Our analysis leads us to a marketing strategy that addresses two issues: first, findings 
concerning  past  banking  experiences  and  product  features  imply  that  positioning 
MFIs to be different from commercial banks is crucial. Business owners interested in 
microloan  products  report  negative  experiences  with  banks  that  may  drive  them 
away  from  commercial  banks  when  shopping  for  loans.  Furthermore,  these 
customers value speed and flexibility in the process of receiving loans. Given the 
rather  slow  approval  processes  of  banks,  this  is  a  unique  selling  proposition  for 
MFIs.  
 
Apart from this general strategic positioning, we can derive the criteria that define a 
typical  MFI  target  group.  When  looking  at  the  results  of  our  target  group 
membership  model,  a  distinctive  pattern  appears:  the  microloan  target  group  is 
typically made up of retail business owners, foreign business owners, and persons 
with a loan history on the private market rather than the bank market. Thus, MFIs 
could start by targeting retail businesses, offering microloans that respond to their 
special  business  needs.  Furthermore,  a  demand  for  microloans  also  arises  in  the 
periods  after  a  business  has  been  founded.  Therefore,  it  makes  sense  to  target 
microfinance promotion at businesses that have been operating for more than one 
year. It has to be emphasized that such a strategy of focusing on more experienced 
business owners corresponds to the needs of MFIs to reduce their lending risks. It is 
much easier for loan officers to differentiate between low and high-risk potential 
clients if these entrepreneurs have already passed the start-up period and gathered 
experience in their respective markets. 
 
Furthermore, the loan-granting process should be as ‘non-bank’ as possible, that is, it 
should give customers the feeling that their needs are understood and that they are 
respected as fully fledged clients. Given the importance of the physical environment 
(Baker, Berry and Parasuraman, 1988; Baker, Grewal and Parasuraman, 1994), it 
might even make sense to design MFI offices differently from bank offices. This idea 
is supported by our interviews with the members of the focus group, who expressed 
the feeling of having been treated badly by loan officers at several local MFIs (that 
were  publicly  financed)  -  similar  to  the  perceptions  of  survey  participants  about 
conventional banks.   22 
 
This result is also meaningful for the design of appropriate micro-lending products. 
On the one hand, it is crucial that loans have a high probability of being approved: a 
commonly  used  rule  of  thumb  is  a  90%  approval  rate.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is 
important  as  well  to  keep  the  supply-side  problems  in  mind  that  we  mentioned 
briefly in the introduction, for example, adverse selection and moral hazard. To meet 
both challenges, micro-lending products need to be designed in such a way that a 
high self-selection process takes place, identifying potential members of the target 
groups and at the same time attracting as many creditworthy persons as possible. 
 
We  can  further  conclude  that  marketing  by  a  specially  designed  MFI  will  be 
successful only if it employs well-trained loan officers who know how to offer high-
quality  customer  services  and  can  guarantee  a  fast,  efficient  process  of  loan 
screening and approval. These insights also reveal why many successful MFIs in 
Eastern Europe do not employ former bankers as loan officers: instead, they prefer 
loan  officers  with  a  background  in  psychology  and  no  previous  professional 
experience in the traditional banking sector. 
 
7. Conclusion 
It almost goes without saying that small and micro-businesses have more difficulties 
in getting access to outside finance than larger firms do. The loans they require are 
too small to attract commercial banks, and small business owners are less able to 
signal their risk-taking behavior than managers of larger companies. In response to 
this need, during the last decade, about two dozen local MFIs have been set up in 
Germany offering loan products aimed at start-ups. However, their success measured 
in terms of outreach remained far below expectations. 
 
To  better  understand  the  demand  side  of  this  market  segment  in  Germany,  we 
conducted a survey of 213 entrepreneurs and interviewed them about their funding 
needs and their affinity to a typical microlending product. As to the approximate size 
of the market, 65% of the business owners in our sample reported that they were able 
to  operate  without  outside  finance.  Thus,  it  might  be  true  as  suggested  in  the 
introduction that the majority of small and micro-business owners are excluded from 
access to small loans. However, our survey reveals that a large proportion of these   23 
small business owners did not even ask for outside finance. Further research should 
therefore be directed at finding out the reasons why this is so. 
 
Among the remaining 35% needing outside finance, two out of five were interested 
in a microloan, even if annual interest rates amounted to 20%. These people were 
termed as the target group. As we found two different financing patterns, we are able 
to further specify the target group: non-members needed funds particularly during 
their start-up phase, while target group members exhibited fairly constant funding 
needs over the first three years of operations and significantly lower funding needs 
than  the  former  group  in  year  one.  Our  survey  also  shows  that  there  are  certain 
businesses  that  are  particularly  interested  in  microlending  products,  among  them 
foreign and retail business owners, persons who received loans from their private 
network,  and  persons  who  were  dissatisfied  with  the  service  quality  offered  by 
banks, where they had felt patronized by loan officers. 
 
With  respect  to  the  general  impression  mentioned  in  the  introduction  that  most 
entrepreneurs  are  excluded  from  the  credit  market,  we  are  able  to  give  a  more 
differentiated  answer:  it is  true  that  the  loan  applications  of  some  start-ups  were 
rejected by more than one bank, but in our survey, these were only about 10% of the 
complete sample. It is also true that only about 20% of the young entrepreneurs in 
our sample financed their business with a loan during the start-up period. However, 
as our analysis shows, these figures do not allow for the conclusion that 80% of the 
entrepreneurs face financial problems during their start-up period because they are 
excluded from the credit market. 
 
Our  research,  therefore,  gives  evidence  that  by  targeting  only  start-ups  the  local 
government-owned or government-financed MFIs unnecessarily confined their target 
markets.  Furthermore,  the  loan  products  they  offered  were  inappropriate  to  the 
demands  of  their  potential  clients.  For  the  future,  federal  and  local  government 
activities should be refocused. Instead of developing own products (which are then 
distributed  through  local  MFIs)  or  the  provision  of  loan  capital  with  heavy 
restrictions  on  the  access  to  their  special  loan  funds,  the  government  should 
concentrate on the provision of risk capital available without any restrictions except   24 
for a maximum loan size and outreach-oriented targets and incentives to those banks 
and MFIs who aim to use these special funds.
24 
 
As a result, the following marketing strategies  appear  crucial: first, microlending 
products should be addressed specifically to the target group, namely, those firms 
labeled in this paper according to their financial needs as micro-businesses. These 
businesses are not necessarily in the start-up phase but have been operating for some 
time. Second, instead of focusing on young entrepreneurs in general - which does not 
allow for the development of any specific product design - micro-businesses should 
be targeted through product features designed specifically for the subgroup that we 
identified. Third, the decisive features to create a demand for microlending products 
even at higher interest rates are: quick and easy access to loans, and an environment 
which does not remind the customers of their last bank visit. 
 
In order to provide such good service quality to their customers, MFIs will have to 
employ professionally trained loan officers who are able to put the crucial product 
features into action and to carry out effective screening procedures at the same time 
in order to maintain a low percentage of high-risk clients. Only then will an MFI 
successfully attract customers and be able to promote its unique advantages over 
commercial  banks.  Since  many  of  the  potential  customers  are  not  necessarily 
excluded from the traditional banking system, it also has to be emphasized that MFIs 
might gamble away their credibility in a very short period of time (as some already 
have) if their loan officers behave similarly to those at commercial banks. 
 
We conclude that, although smaller than expected, there is a market for microlending 
in Germany. It has potential to grow especially if there is a latent demand among the 
astonishingly  high  share  of  business  owners  who  reported  no  need  for  outside 
finance (in particular among those who are currently afraid of applying for a loan). 
This latency could be explained by a lack of awareness on the part of the business 
owners  of  existing  microlending  options:  with  the  right  products  already  in  the 
market, they merely have to look for the products offering the characteristics they 
might not have been able to articulate (see also Earl and Potts, 2000). One possible 
                                                 
24 The Small Business Administration (SBA) in the US plays certainly a similar role to the MFIs, and 
the German KfW has recently started to work in the same direction.   25 
step  would  therefore  be  to  increase  advertising  efforts  to  raise  awareness  among 
potential clients.   26 
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Appendix 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for the two subsamples. 
*** significant at a 1% level   ** significant at a 5% level   * significant at a 10% level (‘-‘ indicates 
that more than 10% of cells have expected count less than 5) 
ª adjusted for outliers (funding requirements exceeding € 100.000 in at least one year)  
 
Table 2: Comparison of funding needs between borrowers (B) and non-borrowers 
(NB). 
 













None  2.6  13.1  50.0  65.0  52.6  65.7 
Less than €5,000  19.7  43.8  25.0  24.1  26.3  26.3 
> €5,000 – €10,000   25.0  24.1  11.8  8.0  9.2  6.6 
> €10,000 – 
€25,000  
23.7  14.6  9.2  1.5  6.6  1.5 
> €25,000 – 
€50,000  
19.7  3.6  1.3  1.5  2.6  0 
More than 
€50,000 
9.2  0.7  2.6  0  2.6  0 
 
Borrowers  Non-
borrowers  Variable 








  Academic 
  Master craftsman 
Age 











Funding needs year 1 (‘000 €)ª 
Funding needs year 2 (‘000 €)ª 

























































































































35% had funding gap
52% used combination of private loan and 
equity




58% used combination of private loan
and equity











35% had funding gap
52% used combination of private loan and 
equity




58% used combination of private loan
and equity
17% used existing overdraft
25% other
 




Table 3: Comparison of unsuccessful (U) and successful (S) loan applicants (N=74). 
Mean Ranks  Statements 
U  S 
z-value 
(Prob > |z|) 
All in all, I had a positive impression of 





49.27  -3.14 
(0.001) 
I felt I was taken seriously and treated as a 





52.13  -3.70 
(0.000) 
I had the feeling that the loan officer to 






47.65  -2.31 
(0.021) 






48.99  -2.74 
(0.006) 
I received comprehensive information on 










   31 
Table 4: Comparison of target group (T) and non-target group members (NT) who 
received a loan (N=40). 
 
Mean ranks  Statements 
T  NT 
z-value 
(Prob > |z|) 
All in all, I have a positive impression of 







I felt I was taken seriously and treated as a 







I had the feeling that the loan officer to 





21.65  -2.03 
(0.042) 









I received comprehensive information on 













Table 5: Comparison of target group members (T) and non-target group members 
(NT) (N=74). 
 
Mean ranks  Statements 
T  NT 
z-value 
(Prob > |z|) 
I am agreeable to accepting higher interest 
rates when taking a loan if this allows 




37.21  -0.28 
(0.8) 
In my line of business, it is crucial to 







It matters to me to pay no amortizations, 





35.64  -0.92 
(0.36) 
I am willing to pay higher interest rates 







Individual support given by the contact 
person is as important to me as to the 




























































Figure 2: Funding needs (lines, right scale) and equity ratios (bars, left scale) of 
target group and non-target group members adjusted for outliers with funding needs 
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Table 6: Binary Logit Estimation of determinants of target group membership. 
Explanatory Variables  Model A  Model B  Model C 
Gender (female=1)  -0.63 (0.64)  -0.97 (0.77)  -2.83 (1.63)* 
Age  -0.03 (0.04)  0.02 (0.05)  -0.03 (0.08) 
Nationality (foreigner=1)  2.47 (1.54)*  2.44 (1.44)*  5.04 (2.46)** 
Education 
  (academics=1) 










Preceding period of unem-
ployment (months) 
0.01 (0.03)  -0.01 (0.03)  0.08 (0.07) 
Line of business 
  (retail=1) 
  (crafts=1) 











Team foundation    2.03 (1.11)*  3.44 (2.15) 
Received private loan      2.46 (1.40)* 
Received bank loan      -4.85 (1.96)** 
Received overdraft      -1.03 (1.66) 
Liquidity finance      -2.71 (1.90) 
Funding needs in year 2 or 3       2.64 (1.64)* 
Constant  1.38 (1.78)  -1.34 (2.26)  0.43 (3.62) 
Nagelkerke R²  0.345  0.485  0.754 
Cox & Snell R²  0.254  0.357  0.556 
Model Chi²  50.28  27.4  18.21 
Number of observations  75  75  75 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** significant at a 1% level    ** significant at a 5% level    * significant at a 10% level 
 